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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Utah Code §78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Was the Defendant denied his right to effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution?
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal is

reviewed as a question of law." State v. Clark. 2004 UT 25, ^ 6, 89 P.3d 162.
II.

Did the trial court err in not sua sponte dismissing the case after the State
completed its case in chief?
On appeal for this issue, the Court reviews "the record facts in a light most

favorable to the jury's verdict and recite the facts accordingly." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d
337, 339 (Utah 1997). Because Defendant did not move for dismissal after the State's
case in chief, as a general rule that may not be raised on appeal "unless the defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v.
Hoigate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah 2000).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution Amendment VI, relevant to defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, is attached as Addendum E.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Defendant in this case, Joseph Craig Peterson was married to the victim in this
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case, Peggy D. Peterson. On September 25, 2005, an ex parte protective order was issued
by the Second District Court, with Peggy as the petitioner and the Defendant as the
respondent (Addendum A of Appellant's Brief). On October 21, 2005, after receiving
argument and evidence and with both parties being represented, the Second Judicial
District Court issued a protective order (Addendum B of Appellant's Birief). This order
was signed and served upon the Defendant in open court (Add. B 8). In the protective
order, the Court specifically found that the Defendant posed "a credible threat to the
safety of [Peggy] (Rec. 2:1). It also specifically prohibited the Defendant "from directly
or indirectly contacting...or otherwise communicating with [Peggy]," unless the
communication was "only to discuss the welfare and visitation of minor children" (Rec.
3:3). Other portions of the protective order prohibit the Defendant going to Peggy's
residence (Rec. 3:3) and staying away from other places frequented by Peggy (Rec. 3:4).
On October 25, 2005, a temporary order was issued in the divorce action involving
Peggy and the Defendant (Attached as Addendum F). This order dealt mainly with
visitation, custody and support of the couple's children. The only mention of contact
between Peggy and the Defendant is found in paragraph 12, which states:
Consistent with the Protective Order in Case No. 054901856, filed in District
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, Petitioner shall not pick up the children
from Respondent's home nor return the children to Respondent's home but shall
utilize acceptable third parties to do so.
(Add. F). This order was signed by the same commissioner, Douglas B. Thomas, who
had heard the protective order hearing four days before (Add. F at 4).
2

On February 13, 2006, both orders were still in effect (Rec. 55:16-18). On that
date, the Defendant's sister brought the couple's children back to Peggy in accordance
with the Court's orders after being with the Defendant (Rec. 56:12-22). When the
Defendant's sister brought the children home, she gave Peggy a package from the
Defendant (Rec. 57:13-19; 70:23-25, 71:1-14; 89:9-16). The package contained a
miniature rose plant and two Valentine's cards addressed to Peggy in hopes of her
reconciling with the Defendant (Rec. 57:15-16; 70:23-25, 71:1-14). This was all admitted
to by the Defendant (Rec. 89:9-16).
On February 16, 2006, Peggy reported this incident to the police and this case
ensued (Rec. 74:18-19). A trial was held in this case on December 4, 2006. After the
State rested, the Defendant did not ask for a directed verdict in the case and the trial court
did not sua sponte dismiss the case (Rec. 83). The only witness for the defense was the
Defendant (Rec. 83). His only defense was his self-serving testimony that he did not
understand that the protective order survived the later temporary orders in the divorce
action and that it was his understanding that the temporary orders allowed for some type
of reconciliation (Rec. 88). The jury found the Defendant guilty.
The Appellant has already filed a Rule 23B Motion to Remand in this case. That
motion was denied on May 11, 2007 because the Appellant failed to put forth "any
affidavits of witnesses who would have purportedly testified at trial," or "detail their
testimony" (Addendum D of Appellant's Brief).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issue I. Appellant claims that his right to effective assistance of counsel was
denied because his attorney failed to subpoena witnesses which would have assisted in his
defense. The main problem with Appellant's assertion is that the record before the Court
does not reveal what those witnesses would have said. In his motion for a Rule 23B
remand, Appellant failed to provide the court with any evidence that would put forth what
the witness who did not testify at trial would have said. Thus, in this motion the court is
left with the record before it. The only item in the record containing any showing what
the witnesses may have said is a self-serving statement by the Defendant that his attorney
told him that the subsequent temporary orders in the divorce case allowed him and Peggy
"to get back together" (Record 88:5-6; 100:8-13). Naturally, this information was only
admitted to show the Defendant's state of mind and the jury was specifically instructed to
disregard the statement for purposes of determining what Defendant's attorney said was
true or not" (Record 87:11-18). Without that information it is impossible to gauge
whether the Defendant has been prejudiced by his counsel's decision.
Issue II. Appellant claims that the temporary orders entered four days after the
protective order was entered 'modified' the protective order, allowing him to contact
Peggy. A plain reading of the temporary orders does not lead to that conclusion at all. In
fact, paragraph 12 of the temporary orders fully supports the interpretation that the
Protective Order was to remain in place unabridged, including the provision barring

4

indirect contact with Peggy. Further, sufficient evidence of each element of the offense
charged was presented by the state in its case-in-chief to convict the Defendant of
violating a protective order.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must

satisfy the two-prong test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
"Defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of this test." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182, 186 (Utah 1990). The first prong requires a defendant show that counsel's
performance was "deficient", in the sense that counsel was not a reasonably competent
attorney. Id. at 687. When examining counsel's deficiency under Strickland,
[judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or
adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense
after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of
counsel was unreasonable. . . Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action 'might be considered sound trial strategy'.
Id. at 689.
As relating to the first prong of the test, the Appellant claims that his former
counsel's sole indiscretion was not calling his divorce attorney Robert Neely to the stand
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in his trial.1 The first problem with Appellant's contention is that the substance of Mr.
Neely's testimony is unknown. It may very well be that not calling him to the stand was
sound trial strategy. Without any further information, the Court cannol gauge whether
former counsel's decision to not call Mr. Neely as a witness was deficient under the first
prong of Strickland.
Even if the Court could over look this missing piece of information, the record
before the court, specifically the copy of the protective order and subsequent temporary
orders and the examination of the Defendant show that two orders are in harmony with
each other. Overcoming the obvious language of the two orders would be quite a feat for
any attorney to explain away.
The second prong of the Strickland test requires that in addition to whether
counsel's performance was deficient, that deficiency must be prejudicial in that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id- In
order to determine whether an attorney's actions were deficient, some basis must exist
showing that the missing testimony would yield exculpatory evidence. See Parsons v.

Appellant does claim in his brief that "others could also corroborate his statements
that Peggy Peterson in the underlying protective order were either invalid or
untrue"(Appellant's Brief page 9); however these "others" are never identified, neither is
nature of their testimony clear.
6

Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 526 (Utah 1994) (where the Court found that defendants' who base
ineffective assistance claims on their counsels' failure to obtain crucial discovery
documents must proffer evidence showing that proper discovery would have yielded
exculpatory evidence). "Speculation that [exculpatory evidence] exists is not sufficient to
meet the prejudice component of the [ineffective assistance of counsel] test. Id.
II.

THE JUDGE'S FAILURE TO DISMISS THE CASE SUA SPONTE
AFTER THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
In determining this issue the appellate court must go through two different steps.

First, the court must "determine whether there was sufficient evidence to convict a
defendant." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^[18, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah 2000). In doing so, it
does "not examine whether [it] believe[s] that the evidence at trial established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id- Rather, [the Court] will conclude that the evidence was
insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence cis sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Id.
(internal citations omitted). To apply the second step the Court first must "conclude that
the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant." Id. If it so concludes, then it can
look at "whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain
error to submit the case to the jury." Id.
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Appellant claims that the temporary orders entered four days after the protective
order was entered 'modified' the protective order, allowing him to contact Peggy.
Viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, a plain reading of the temporary orders in conjunction with the protective
order does not lead to such a conclusion.
The protective order was signed and served upon the Defendant in open court on
October 21, 2005 and this was admitted as evidence in the trial (Add. B 8; Rec. 54-55).
In the protective order, the Court specifically found that the Defendant posed "a credible
threat to the safety of [Peggy]" (Add. B 2:1). It also specifically prohibited the Defendant
"from directly or indirectly contacting...or otherwise communicating with [Peggy],"
unless the communication was "only to discuss the welfare and visitation of minor
children" (3:3). Other portions of the protective order prohibit the Defendant going to
Peggy's residence (3:3) and staying away from other places frequented by Peggy (3:4).
The temporary orders from October 25, 2005 were issued in the divorce action
involving Peggy and the Defendant (Attached as Addendum F). The only mention of
contact between Peggy and the Defendant is found in paragraph 12, which states:
Consistent with the Protective Order in Case No. 054901856, filed in District
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, Petitioner shall not pick up the children
from Respondent's home nor return the children to Respondent's home but shall
utilize acceptable third parties to do so.
(Add. F). This order was signed by the same commissioner, Douglas B. Thomas, who
had heard the protective order hearing four days before (Add. F at 4). The Appellant in
8

cross during the State's case in chief attempted to convince Peggy that because the
temporary orders ordered him to have no contact with her parents, it implicitly voided the
protective order (Record 62-64). A plain reading of the protective order and temporary
order and a cursory glance at Peggy's testimony shows that it was a violation for the
Defendant to have indirect contact with Peggy.
In the evidence provided to the jury in the State's case in chief, the record clearly
shows that the Defendant through his sister sent flowers and Valentine's Day cards to
Peggy. (Rec. 57; 71:11-14). This was a clear violation of paragraph 3 of the protective
order, which had been served upon the Defendant. (Addendum B of Appellant's Brief).
Further, testimony presented by the victim, Peggy Peterson, shows that the course of
dealings between the Defendant and herself were done according to the protective order
until the Defendant sent the cards and flowers on February 13, 2005. (Rec. 61-64).
Viewing the evidence in the State's case in chief and drawing all inferences in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, the state presented sufficient evidence to convict the
Defendant. Also, no evidentiary defect existed so that it was obvious and fundamental
that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Because Appellant's claim that the
temporary orders modified the protective order is so far afield, the trial court's failure
dismiss the case sua sponte was proper and Appellant's request is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the appellee asks this Court to affirm the jury's finding the
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Appellant/Defendant guilty of violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108.
DATED this 26th day of September, 2007.

Teral L. Tree
Attorney for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the ZT"7 day of September, 2007,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to John
Caine, 2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite. 200, Ogden, Utah 84401.
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ADDENDUM E

United States Const. Amend. VI

A m e n d m e n t VI.

Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH PETERSON,
Petitioner,

MINUTES
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS

vs.

Case No: 054901923 SM

PEGGY D PETERSON,
Respondent

Clerk:

\

Commissioner:
DOUGLAS B THOMAS
Date:
October 25, 2005

tammya

PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: ROBERT NEELEY
Petitioner(s): JOSEPH PETERSON
Other Parties: JANELL YOUNG, DCFS REPRESENTATIVE
Attorney for the Respondent: PATRICK L KELLEY
Respondent(s): PEGGY D PETERSON
Audio
Tape Number:
CD 81
Tape Count: 2 34-317

HEARING
This is the time set for a motion for temporary orders. DCFS
representative gives her report and recommendations.
Court hears argument on the motion for temporary orders.
Court finds that it is not necessary to impose supervised
visitation on petitioner. Petitioner is refrained from having
homeless people around the children and in their home.
Petitioner must be with the children and supervising them during
his visitation. If he needs to leave them with someone, it must be
someone with a long standing relationship. Petitioner is not to let
bhe child play around the junk pile.
Parties are refrained from making derogatory remarks about each
Dther around the children and this includes any third parties.
Petitioner can provide work and education related child care.
The terms of the protective order remains in full force and
effect. There is to be no contact between petitioner and
Page 1

^

Case No: 054901923
Date:
Oct 25, 2005
respondent's parents.
Parties agree the that child support shall be set at $270.00 per
month to respondent. Petitioner to have standard visitation.
Petitioner may have the children today from 5 to 8 p.m.
Mr. Neeley is to prepare the order.

Page 2 (last)

